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ABSTRACT
In this work, we consider misinformation propagating through
a social network and study the problem of its prevention. In
this problem, a “bad” campaign starts propagating from a
set of seed nodes in the network and we use the notion of
a limiting (or “good”) campaign to counteract the effect of
misinformation. The goal is then to identify a subset of k
users that need to be convinced to adopt the limiting cam-
paign so as to minimize the number of people that adopt the
“bad” campaign at the end of both propagation processes.
This work presents RPS (Reverse Prevention Sampling),
an algorithm that provides a scalable solution to the mis-
information prevention problem. Our theoretical analysis
shows that RPS runs in O((k+ l)(n+m)( 1
1−γ ) logn/
2) ex-
pected time and returns a (1−1/e−)-approximate solution
with at least 1−n−l probability (where γ is a typically small
network parameter). The time complexity of RPS substan-
tially improves upon the previously best-known algorithms
that run in time Ω(mnk · POLY (−1)). We experimentally
evaluate RPS on large datasets and show that it outper-
forms the state-of-the-art solution by several orders of mag-
nitude in terms of running time. This demonstrates that
misinformation prevention can be made practical while still
offering strong theoretical guarantees.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Social networks allow for the widespread distribution of
knowledge and information in modern society as they are
rapidly becoming a place for people to hear the news and dis-
cuss social topics. Information can spread quickly through
the network eventually reaching a large audience, especially
so for influential users. However, while the ease of infor-
mation propagation in social networks can be beneficial, it
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can also have disruptive effects. In recent years, the number
of high profile instances of misinformation causing severe
real-world effects has risen sharply. These examples range
across a number of social media platforms and topics. A se-
ries of bogus tweets from a trusted news network referring to
explosions at the White House caused immediate and exten-
sive repercussions in the financial markets [8]. During a re-
cent shooting at YouTube’s headquarters, and before police
managed to secure the area, a wave of misinformation and
erroneous accusations were widely disseminated on Twitter
causing panic and confusion [21, 10]. Finally, there has been
much discussion on the role misinformation and fake news
played in the 2016 U.S. presidential election with sites such
as Reddit and Facebook being accused of harbouring and
spreading divisive content and misinformation [11, 23, 1].
Thus, in order for social networks to serve as a reliable plat-
form for disseminating critical information, it is necessary
to have tools to limit the spread of misinformation.
Budak et al. [4] were the first to formulate the problem of
misinformation prevention as a combinatorial optimization
problem. By building upon the seminal work of Kempe et
al. [15] on influence maximization for the single campaign
model to handle multiple campaigns (“bad” and “good”),
they present a greedy approach that provides a (1−1/e−)-
approximate solution. Unfortunately the greedy approach of
[4] is plagued by the same scaling issues as [15] when con-
sidering large social networks and is further exacerbated by
the added complexity of tracking multiple cascades which
requires costly shortest paths computations. This leads us
to the motivating question for this paper: Can we find scal-
able algorithms for the misinformation prevention problem
introduced in [4]?
The scalability hurdle for the case of a single campaign
was recently resolved by Borgs et al. [3] when they made a
theoretical breakthrough that fundamentally shifts the way
in which we view the influence maximization problem. Their
key insight was to reverse the question of “what subset of the
network can a particular user influence” to “who could have
influenced a particular user”. Their sampling method runs
in close to linear time and returns a (1−1/e−)-approximate
solution with at least 1−n−l probability. In addition, Tang
et al. [24] presented a significant advance that improved the
practical efficiency of the work by Borgs et al. through a
careful theoretical analysis that rids the approach of [3] of a
large hidden constant in the runtime guarantee.
Borgs et al. [3] leave open the question whether their tech-
niques can be extended to other influence propagation mod-
els. In this work, we resolve the question of [3] for the mis-
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information prevention problem and achieve scalability in
the multi-campaign model. We complement our theoretical
analysis with extensive experiments which show an improve-
ment of several orders of magnitude over Budak et al. [4].
Since influence in the single campaign setting corresponds
to reachability in the network, our solution requires mapping
the concept of reachability to an analogous notion in the
multi-campaign model of [4]. In [4] they introduce shortest
paths as the metric to determine the set of nodes that can be
saved from adopting the misinformation (i.e. influenced by
the “good” information). Our first contribution is to identify
that shortest paths alone are not sufficient in determining
the ability to save a particular node in the network and
introduce the crucial notion of blocked nodes.
Using our newly defined notion of blocking, we generalize
the sampling-based approach of Borgs et al. to the multi-
campaign setting. A major contribution of this work, and
critical difference from the approach of [3], is a modified
breadth-first search we design to compute the set of nodes
that could have saved a particular user from adopting the
misinformation. Our novel algorithm handles the notion
of blocked nodes when traversing in the transpose graph by
utilizing detailed bookkeeping techniques to effectively track
those nodes that would become blocked.
Furthermore, we are able to adapt optimization ideas from
Tang et al. to further improve the scalability of our ap-
proach. In particular, we show that our algorithm can effi-
ciently handle graphs with more than 50 million edges. As
a consequence, we are able to match the progress of both [3]
and [24] together in this work.
Finally, we obtain theoretical guarantees on the expected
runtime and solution quality for our new approach and show
that its expected runtime substantially improves upon the
expected runtime of [4]. Additionally, we rule out sublinear
algorithms for our problem through a lower bound on the
time required to obtain a constant approximation.
In summary, the contributions of this paper are:
1. We introduce the concept of blocked nodes that fully
captures the requirements necessary for preventing the
adoption of misinformation in the multi-campaign model.
2. We design and implement a novel BFS-based algo-
rithm for computing the set of nodes that could save
a particular user from adopting the misinformation.
3. We propose a misinformation prevention approach which
returns a (1− 1/e− )-approximate solution with high
probability in the multi-campaign model and show that
its expected runtime substantially improves upon the
expected runtime of the algorithm of Budak et al. [4].
4. We give a lower bound of Ω(m+n) on the time required
to obtain a constant approximation for the misinfor-
mation prevention problem.
5. We experiment with large datasets and show that our
algorithm gives an improvement of several orders of
magnitude over Budak et al. [4] and can efficiently
handle graphs with more than 50 million edges.
2. PRELIMINARIES
In this section, we formally define the multi-campaign dif-
fusion model, the eventual influence limitation problem pre-
sented by Budak et al. [4], and present an overview of Kempe
et al. and Borgs et al.’s work [15, 3] on the influence maxi-
mization problem.
2.1 Diffusion Model
Let G be a social network with a node set V and a directed
edge set E, with |V | = n and |E| = m. Let C (for “bad
Campaign”) and L (for “Limiting”) denote two influence
campaigns. Assume that each directed edge e in G is as-
sociated with propagation probabilities pC(e), pL(e) ∈ [0, 1].
Further, let G be the underlying unweighted graph (ignoring
edge probabilities). Given G, the Multi-Campaign Indepen-
dent Cascade model (MCIC) of Budak et al. [4] considers a
time-stamped influence propagation process as follows:
1. At timestamp 1, we activate selected sets AC and AL
of nodes in G for campaigns C and L respectively, while
setting all other nodes inactive.
2. If a node u is first activated at timestamp i in campaign
C (or L), then for each directed edge e that points from
u to an inactive neighbour v in C (or L), u has pC(e)
(or pL(e)) probability to activate v at timestamp i+1.
After timestamp i+ 1, u cannot activate any node.
3. In the case when two or more nodes from different
campaigns are trying to activate v at a given time step
we assume that the “good information” (i.e. campaign
L) takes effect.
4. Once a node becomes activated in one campaign, it
never becomes inactive or changes campaigns.
2.2 Eventual Influence Limitation
A natural objective function, as outlined in [4], is “saving”
as many nodes as possible. That is, we seek to minimize the
number of nodes that end up adopting campaign C when
the propagation process is complete. This is referred to as
the eventual influence limitation problem (EIL).
Let AC and AL be the set of nodes from which campaigns
C and L start, respectively. Let I(AC) be the set of nodes
that are activated in campaign C in the absence of L when
the above propagation process converges and pi(AL) be the
size of the subset of I(AC) that campaign L prevents from
adopting campaign C. We refer to AL and AC as the seed
sets, I(AC) as the influence of campaign C, and pi(AL) as
the prevention of campaign L. The nodes that are pre-
vented from adopting campaign C are referred to as saved.
Note that pi(AL) is a random variable that depends on the
edge probabilities that each node uses in determining out-
neighbors to activate.
Now, notice that the above process has the following equiv-
alent description. We can interpret G as a distribution over
unweighted directed graphs, where each edge e is indepen-
dently realized with probability pC(e) (or pL(e)). If we real-
ize a graph g according to this probability distribution, then
we can associate the set of saved nodes in the original pro-
cess with the set of nodes which campaign L reaches before
campaign C during the diffusion process in g ∼ G. We will
make use of this alternative formulation of the MCIC model
throughout the paper.
Budak et al. [4] present a simplified and natural version
of the problem where the information from campaign L is
accepted by users with probability 1 (pL(e) = 1 if edge e ex-
ists and pL(e) = 0 otherwise). This is referred to as the high
effectiveness property. In [4] it is shown that EIL with the
high effectiveness property is NP-hard. Interestingly, with
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the high effectiveness property, the prevention function is
submodular and thus the greedy approach yields approxi-
mation guarantees. Budak et al. study and obtain results
for this version of the EIL problem and is the problem that
we consider here.
Further, as in [4], we assume that the spread of influence
for campaign C starts from a single node vc, referred to as
the adversary node. However, note that our approach can
be easily extended to the case where C starts from a set
of nodes. Additionally, our approach works when we allow
campaign C to be detected with delay ∆ at which time
campaign L is initiated.
Problem Statement. Given G, seed set AC , and a
positive integer k, the eventual influence limitation (EIL)
problem asks for a size-k seed set AL maximizing the value
of E[pi(AL)].
2.3 Influence Maximization Problem
In the following we outline two approaches to the well
studied influence maximization problem (IM). This problem
is posed in the popular Independent Cascade model (IC)
which, unlike the MCIC model, only considers a single cam-
paign. The goal here is to compute a seed set S of size k
that maximizes the influence of S in G.
2.3.1 Kempe et al.’s Greedy Approach
Kempe et al.’s approach [15] to the IM problem (referred
to as Greedy in the following) builds up the seed set S in k
iterations by adding one node to S in each round. In each
iteration it adds into S the node u that gives the largest
marginal increase in E[I(S)].
However, the computation of E[I(S)] is #P-hard. There-
fore, the node u leading to the largest marginal increase in
influence must be estimated via a sufficient number of Monte
Carlo simulations. In [14] it is shown that if we take a large
number r ∈ Ω(POLY (n

)) of measurements in the estima-
tion of each E[I(S)], then, with high probability, Greedy
yields a (1− 1/e− )-approximate solution in the IC model.
Note, if we let RH(S) be the set of nodes in H that are
reachable from S (a node v in H is reachable from S if there
exists a directed path in H that starts from a node in S and
ends at v), then I(S) = Rg(S) for a fixed g ∼ G.
Despite Greedy ’s simplicity, its ability to scale to large so-
cial networks is severely restricted by its Ω(mnk·POLY (−1))
time complexity. As a result, Greedy runs for days even
when the network contains only a few thousand nodes [5].
2.3.2 Borgs et al.’s Method
Borgs et al. [3] propose a novel method for solving the IM
problem under the IC model that avoids the limitations of
Greedy. We follow the convention of [24] and refer to the
method of [3] as Reverse Influence Sampling (RIS). To ex-
plain how RIS works, Tang et al. [24] introduce the following
definitions:
Definition 1 (Reverse Reachable Set) The reverse reach-
able (RR) set for a node v in g ∼ G is the set of nodes that
can reach v. (That is, for each node u in the RR set, there
is a directed path from u to v in g.)
Definition 2 (Random RR Set) A random RR set is
an RR set generated on an instance of g ∼ G, for a node
selected uniformly at random from g.
The connection between RR sets and node activations is
formalized in the following lemma.
Lemma 1. [3] For any seed set S and node v, the probabil-
ity that an influence propagation process from S can activate
v equals the probability that S overlaps an RR set for v.
Note that an RR set for a node v is generated by sampling
a g ∼ G. Based on this result, Borgs’ et al. RIS algorithm
runs in two steps
1. Generate random RR sets from G until a threshold on
the total number of steps taken has been reached.
2. Consider the maximum coverage problem of selecting
k nodes to cover the maximum number of RR sets
generated. Use the standard greedy algorithm for the
problem to derive a (1−1/e)-approximate solution S∗k .
Return S∗k as the seed set to use for activation.
The rationale behind RIS is as follows: if a node u appears
in a large number of RR sets it should have a high probabil-
ity to activate many nodes under the IC model; hence, u’s
expected influence should be large. As such, we can think of
the number of RR sets u appears in as an estimator for u’s
expected influence. By the same reasoning, if a size-k node
set S∗k covers most RR sets, then S
∗
k is likely to have the
maximum expected influence among all size-k node sets in
G leading to a good solution to the IM problem. Therefore,
the primary goal is to show that we have a good estimator
for u’s expected influence. The main contribution of Borgs
et al. is an analysis of their proposed threshold-based ap-
proach: they allow RIS to keep generating RR sets, until
the total number of nodes and edges examined during the
generation process reaches a pre-defined threshold Γ. They
show that when Γ is set to Θ((m+ n)k logn/2), RIS runs
in time O((m+n)k logn/2), and it returns a (1− 1/e− )-
approximate solution to the IM problem with at least con-
stant probability.
3. NEW DEFINITIONS
In this section we introduce new definitions that are cru-
cial to our approach. Importantly, we present and discuss
a gap in the work of Budak et al. that requires closing in
order for our approach to be possible.
Given set AL of vertices and (unweighted) directed graph
g ∼ G, write clg(AL) for the set of nodes closer to AL than
AC = {vc} in g. That is, a node w ∈ clg(AL) if there exists
a node v such that v ∈ AL and |SPG(v, w)| ≤ |SPg(vc, w)|
where SPH(v, w) denotes a shortest path from node v to w
in graph H. When g is drawn from G this is a necessary, but
not sufficient1, condition for the set of nodes saved by AL.
We also require that the nodes in clg(AL) not be blocked by
the diffusion of campaign C in g.
Definition 3 (Blocked Nodes) A node w ∈ clg(AL) is
blocked and cannot be saved by AL if for every path p from
AL to w there exists a node u such that |SPg(vc, u)| <
|SPG(AL, u)|.
1In Budak et al.’s work, the set of nodes closer to AL than
AC is established as a necessary and sufficient condition to
save a node in the MCIC model, but we note that this should
be revised to include the blocking condition due to a gap in
the proof of Claim 1 in [4].
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Notation Description
G a social network represented as a weighted
directed graph G
G, GT
the underlying unweighted graph G and its
transpose GT constructed by reversing the
direction of each edge
n, m
the number of nodes and edges in G respec-
tively
k
the size of the seed set for misinformation
prevention
C, L
the misinformation campaign C and the lim-
iting campaign L
pC(e), pL(e)
the propagation probability on an edge e for
campaigns C and L respectively
pi(S)
the prevention of a node set S in a misinfor-
mation propagation process on G (see Sec-
tion 3)
ω(R), ωpi(R)
the number of edges considered in gener-
ating an RRC set and that originate from
nodes in an RRC set R (see Equation 1)
κ(R) see Equation 9
R the set of all RRC sets generated by Algo-
rithm 1
FR(S) the fraction of RRC sets in R that are cov-ered by a node set S
EPT the expected width of a random RRC set
EXPC the expected influence of campaign C
OPTL the maximum pi(S) for any size-k seed set S
KPT
a lower bouund of OPTL established in Sec-
tion 4.2
λ see Equation 4
Table 1: Frequently used notation.
Let blg(AL) be the set of blocked nodes for AL. Concep-
tually, the nodes in blg(AL) are cutoff because some node
on the paths from AL is reached by campaign C before L
which stops the diffusion of L.
To help illustrate the concept of blocked nodes, consider
the graph presented in Figure 1. Assume that the solid lines
are live edges that make up graph g ∼ G in the influence
propagation process. Then, the dotted lines are edges that
were not realized for campaign C. The adversary campaign
C starts from vc while the limiting campaign L starts from v.
vu
w
vc
Figure 1: An example illustrating the concept of blocked nodes.
Observe that |SPG(v, w)| = 4 and |SPg(vc, w)| = 5. How-
ever, w cannot be saved in the resulting cascade since at
timestamp 1 the node u will adopt campaign C. This inter-
sects the shortest path from v to w and therefore campaign L
will not be able to reach node w since a node never switches
campaigns. Thus, we say that node w is blocked by C.
Importantly, the approach of [4] can be recovered with
a modified proof for Claim 1 and Theorem 4.2 of [4]. The
statements must include the notion of blocked nodes in their
inoculation graph definition, but a careful inspection shows
that their objective function remains submodular after this
inclusion. As a result, the greedy approach still provides
the stated approximation guarantees and also allows us to
incorporate the ideas of [3] in our solution (as they require
a submodular objective function).
Next, we formally define the prevention, pi(AL), which
corresponds to the number of nodes saved by AL. That is,
pi(AL) = |Rg(vc)∩(clg(AL)\blg(AL))|. We write E[pi(AL)] =
Eg∼G [pi(AL)] for the expected prevention of AL in G.
We refer to the set of nodes that could have saved u as
the saviours of u. A node w is a candidate saviour for u if
there is a directed path from w to u in G (i.e. reverse reach-
ability). Then, w is a saviour for u subject to the additional
constraint that w would not be cutoff by the diffusion of AC
in g. That is, a candidate saviour w would be cutoff and
cannot be a saviour for u if for every path p from w to u
there exists a node vb such that |SPg(vc, vb)| < |SPG(w, vb)|.
We refer to the set of candidate saviours for u that are cutoff
as τg(u). Thus, we can define the saviours of u as the set
RGT (u) \ τg(u). Therefore, we have:
Definition 4 (Reverse Reachability without Cutoff
Set) The reverse reachability without cutoff (RRC) set for
a node v in g ∼ G is the set of saviour nodes of v, i.e. the
set of nodes that can save v. (That is, for each node u in
the RRC set, u ∈ RGT (u) \ τg(u).) Note, if v 6∈ I(vc) then
we define the corresponding RRC set as empty since v is not
eligible to be saved.
Definition 5 (Random RRC Set) A random RRC set is
an RRC set generated on an instance of g ∼ G, for a node
selected uniformly at random from g.
Finally, let OPTL = maxS:|S|=k{E[pi(S)]} be the maxi-
mum expected prevention of a set of k nodes.
4. REVERSE PREVENTION SAMPLING
This section presents our misinformation prevention method,
Reverse Prevention Sampling (RPS), that applies the RIS
approach to the EIL problem presented in the MCIC model
of Budak et al. [4]. Our approach borrows ideas from the
work of Tang et al. [24] which improves the practical effi-
ciency of Borgs et al. approach. Our algorithm returns a
(1− 1
e
− )-approximation to the EIL problem, with success
probability 1−n−l, in time O((k+ l)(m+n)( 1
1−γ ) logn/
2).
At a high level, RPS consists of two steps.
1. Parameter Estimation. Compute a lower-bound
for the maximum expected prevention among all pos-
sible size-k seed sets for AL and then use the lower-
bound to derive a parameter θ.
2. Node Selection. Sample θ random RRC sets from
G to form a set R and then compute a size-k seed
set S∗k that covers a large number of RRC sets in R.
Return S∗k as the final result.
We briefly remark on the difficulty of deriving θ as it must
be larger than a particular threshold necessary for ensuring
the correctness of RPS, but the threshold depends on the
optimal prevention, which is an unknown quantity. In our
parameter estimation step we derive a θ value for RPS that
is above the threshold but also allows for practical efficiency.
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In the rest of this section we first identify the conditions
necessary for the node selection phase of RPS to return a
good solution and then describe the the parameter estima-
tion phase in detail. Table 1 provides a quick reference to the
frequently used notation. Finally, due to space constraints,
we omit some proofs and only include those that help build
the intuition behind our approach or aid the exposition.
4.1 Node Selection
The pseudocode of RPS ’s node selection step is presented
in Algorithm 1. Given G, k, AC , and a constant θ as in-
put, the algorithm stochastically generates θ random RRC
sets, accomplished by repeated invocation of the preven-
tion of misinformation process, and inserts them into a set
R. Next, the algorithm follows a greedy approach for the
maximum coverage problem to select the final seed set. In
each iteration, the algorithm selects a node vi that covers
the largest number of RRC sets in R, and then removes all
those covered RRC sets from R. The k selected nodes are
put into a set S∗k , which is returned as the final result.
Algorithm 1 NodeSelection(G,k,AC ,θ)
1: R ← ∅
2: Generate θ random RRC sets and insert them into R.
3: Initialize a node set S∗k ← ∅
4: for i = 1,. . . ,k do
5: Identify the node vi that covers the most RRC sets
in R
6: Add vi into S
∗
k
7: Remove from R all RRC sets that are covered by vi
8: return S∗k
Lines 4-8 in Algorithm 1 correspond to a standard greedy
approach for a maximum coverage problem. The problem is
equivalent to maximizing a submodular function with car-
dinality constraints for which it is well known that a greedy
approach returns a (1− 1/e)-approximate solution in linear
time [19].
RRC set generation. Line 2 generates R by repeated
simulation of the misinformation prevention process. The
generation of each random RRC set is implemented as two
breath-first searches (BFS) on G and GT respectively. The
first BFS on G corresponds to a standard randomized BFS
and computes the influence set of AC . The second BFS
on GT is an important algorithmic contribution of this work
that is essential for the RPS approach. This novel bounded-
depth BFS with pruning carefully tracks which nodes will
become blocked and is described in detail below.
The set of nodes traversed by the standard randomized
BFS on G is equivalent to I(vc) for g ∼ G, due to deferred
randomness. Note that in each step of the BFS we record
at each node w the distance from vc to w, denoted D(w),
for use in the second step.
Given a randomly selected node u in G, observe that in
order for u to be able to be saved we require u ∈ I(vc).
Therefore, if the randomly selected node u 6∈ I(vc) then we
return an empty RRC set. On the other hand, if u ∈ I(vc),
we have D(u) = |SPg(vc, u)| as a result of the above ran-
domized BFS which indicates the maximum distance from
u that candidate saviour nodes can exist. We run a second
BFS from u in GT to depth D(u) to determine the saviour
nodes for u by carefully pruning those nodes that would
become blocked.
The bounded-depth BFS with pruning on GT , presented
in Algorithm 2, takes as input a source node u, the maxi-
mum depth D(u), and a directed graph GT . Algorithm 2
utilizes special indicator values associated with each node w
to account for potential cutoffs from vc. Each node w holds
a variable, β(w), which indicates the distance beyond w that
the BFS can go before the diffusion would have been cutoff
by vc in g. The β value for each node w is initialized toD(w).
In each round, the current node w has an opportunity to up-
date the β value of each of its successors only if β(w) > 0.
For each successor z of w, we assign β(z) = β(w) − 1 if
β(z) = null or if β(z) > 0 and β(w) − 1 < β(z). In this
way, each ancestor of z will have an opportunity to apply
a β value to z to ensure that if any ancestor has a β value
then so will z and furthermore, the β variable for z will be
updated with the smallest β value from its ancestors. We
terminate the BFS early if we reach a node w with β(w) = 0.
Figure 2 captures the primary scenarios encountered by
Algorithm 2 when initialized at node u. The enclosing dot-
ted line represents the extent of the influence of campaign C
for the current influence propagation process. First, notice
that if the BFS moves away from vc, as in the case of node
z, that, once we move beyond the influence boundary of vc,
there will be no potential for cutoff. As such, the BFS is free
to traverse until the maximum depth D(u) is reached. On
the other hand, if the BFS moves towards (or perpendicular
to) vc then we must carefully account for potential cutoff.
For example, when the BFS reaches v, we know the distance
from vc to v: D(v) = SPg(vc, v). Therefore, the BFS must
track the fact that there cannot exist saviours at a distance
D(v) beyond v. In other words, if we imagine initializing a
misinformation prevention process from a node w such that
SPG(v, w) > D(v) then v will adopt campaign C before
campaign L can reach v. Therefore, at each out-neighbour
of v we use the knowledge of D(v) to track the distance
beyond v that saviours can exist. This updating process
tracks the smallest such value and is allowed to cross the
enclosing influence boundary of campaign C ensuring that
all potential for cutoff is tracked.
vc
u
v
z
D(v)
SPG(u, v)
D(u)
w
SPG(v, w)
I(vc)
Figure 2: An example illustrating the concept of blocked nodes.
Finally, we collect all nodes visited during the process (in-
cluding u), and use them to form an RRC set. The runtime
of this procedure is precisely the sum of the degrees (in G) of
the nodes in I(vc) plus the sum of the degrees of the nodes
in RGT (u) \ τ(u).
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Algorithm 2 generateRRC(u, D(u), GT )
1: let Q be a queue
2: u.depth = 0
3: Q.enqueue(u)
4: label u as discovered
5: while Q is not empty do
6: w ← Q.dequeue()
7: if w.depth = D(u) OR β(w) = 0 then
8: continue
9: for all nodes z in GT .adjacentEdges(w) do
10: if β(w) > 0 AND β(z) > 0 then
11: if β(w)− 1 < β(z) then
12: β(z)← β(w)− 1
13: else if β(w) > 0 then
14: β(z)← β(w)− 1
15: if z is not labelled as discovered then
16: z.depth = w.depth+ 1
17: Q.enqueue(z)
18: label z as discovered
Performance Bounds. In this section we first define a
quantity EPT that captures the expected number of edges
traversed when generating a random RRC set. After that,
we define the expected runtime of RPS in terms of EPT
and the parameter θ. Finally, we define a threshold for θ
that ensures the correctness of RPS.
First, we refer to the instance of I(vc) used in computing
an RRC set R as MR. Then, we define the width of an
RRC set R, denoted as ω(R), as the number of edges in G
that point to nodes in R plus the number of edges in G that
originate from nodes in MR. That is
ω(R) =
∑
u∈MR
outdegreeG(u) +
∑
v∈R
indegreeG(v) (1)
Furthermore, we define the subwidth of an RRC set R,
denoted as ωpi(R), as the number of edges in G that point
to nodes in R. That is ωpi(R) =
∑
v∈R indegreeG(v). Also,
we define the prewidth of an RRC set R, denoted as ω(MR),
as the number of edges in G that originate from nodes in
MR. That is ω(MR) =
∑
u∈MR outdegreeG(u).
Let EPT be the expected width of a random RRC set,
where the expectation is taken over the randomness in R and
MR, and observe that Algorithm 1 has an expected runtime
of O(θ · EPT ). This can be observed by noting that EPT
captures the expected number of edge traversals required to
generate a random RRC set since an edge is only considered
in the propagation process (either of the two BFS’s) if it
points to a node in R or originates from a node in MR.
The remainder of the section aims to derive a value for θ
that minimizes the expected runtime of Algorithm 1 while
ensuring the quality of the solution returned.
We establish a connection between RRC sets and the pre-
vention process on G. That is, the prevention of a set of
nodes S is precisely n times the probability that a node u,
chosen uniformly at random, has a saviour from S:
Lemma 2. For any seed set S and any node v, the proba-
bility that a prevention process from S can save v equals the
probability that S overlaps an RRC set for v.
Proof. Let S be a fixed set of nodes, and v be a fixed
node. Suppose that we generate an RRC set R for v on
a graph g ∼ G. Let ρ1 be the probability that S overlaps
with R and let ρ2 be the probability that S, when used as
a seed set, can save v in a prevention process on G. By
Definition 4, if v ∈ I(vc) then ρ1 equals the probability that
a node u ∈ S is a saviour for v. That is, ρ1 equals the
probability that G contains a directed path from u ∈ S to
v and u 6∈ τ(v) and 0 if v 6∈ I(vc). Meanwhile, if v ∈ I(vc)
then ρ2 equals the probability that a node u ∈ S can save v
(i.e. v ∈ (clg(u) \ blg(u))) and 0 if v 6∈ I(vc). It follows that
ρ1 = ρ2 due to the symmetry between the set of saviours for
v and the ability to save v.
For any node set S, let FR(S) be the fraction of RRC sets
in R covered by S. Then, based on Lemma 2, we can prove
that the expected value of n · FR(S) equals the expected
prevention of S in G.
Corollary 1. E[n · FR(S)] = E[pi(S)]
Corollary 1 implies that we can estimate E[pi(S)] by es-
timating the fraction of RRC sets in R covered by S. The
number of sets covered by a node v in R is precisely the
number of times we observed that v was a saviour for a ran-
domly selected node u. We can therefore think of n ·FR(S)
as an estimator for E[pi(S)]. Our primary task is to show
that it is a good estimator. Using Chernoff bounds, we show
that n · FR(S) is an accurate estimator of any node set S’s
expected prevention, when θ is sufficiently large:
Lemma 3. Suppose that θ satisfies
θ ≥ (8 + 2)n · l logn+ log
(
n
k
)
+ log 2
OPTL · 2 (2)
Then, for any set S of at most k nodes, the following
inequality holds with at least 1− n−l/(n
k
)
probability:∣∣∣n · FR(S)− E[pi(S)]∣∣∣ < 
2
·OPTL (3)
Based on Lemma 3, we prove that if Eqn. 2 holds, Algo-
rithm 1 returns a (1 − 1/e − )-approximate solution with
high probability by a simple application of Chernoff bounds.
Theorem 1. Given a θ that satisfies Equation 2, Algo-
rithm 1 returns a (1− 1/e− )-approximate solution with at
least 1− n−l/(n
k
)
probability.
An important consideration is that, since OPT is un-
known, we can not set θ directly from Equation 2. For
simplicity, we define
λ = (8 + 2)n ·
(
l logn+ log
(
n
k
)
+ log 2
)
· −2 (4)
and rewrite Equation 2 as
θ ≥ λ/OPTL (5)
The following section details how to derive a θ which not
only satisfies Equation 2, but also leads to an O((k+ l)(m+
n)( 1
1−γ ) logn/
2) expected runtime for Algorithm 1.
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4.2 Parameter Estimation
Our objective is to identify a θ that makes θ · EPT rea-
sonably small, while still ensuring θ ≥ λ/OPTL. First, we
define a probability distribution V∗ over the nodes in G,
such that the probability mass for each node is proportional
to its indegree in G. Let v∗ be a random variable following
V∗ and recall that MR is a random instance of I(vc).
Lemma 4. m
n
·E[pi({v∗})] = EPT −E[ω(MR)], where the
expectation of pi({v∗}) and ω(MR) is taken over the random-
ness in v∗ and the prevention process.
Proof. Let R be a random RRC set, MR be the random
instance of I(vc) used to compute R, and pR be the prob-
ability that a randomly selected edge from G points to a
node in R. Then, EPT = E[ω(MR)] + E[pR ·m], where the
expectation is taken over the random choices of R and MR.
Let v∗ be a sample from V∗ and b(v∗, R) be a boolean
function that returns 1 if v∗ ∈ R, and 0 otherwise. Then, for
any fixed R, pR =
∑
v∗(Pr[v
∗] ·b(v∗, R)). Now consider that
we fix v∗ and vary R. Define pv∗,R =
∑
R(Pr[R] · b(v∗, R))
so that by Lemma 2, pv∗,R equals the probability that a
randomly selected node can be saved in a prevention pro-
cess when {v∗} is used as a seed set. Therefore, E[pv∗,R] =
E[pi({v∗})]/n. This leads to
E[pR] =
∑
R
(Pr[R] · pR)
=
∑
R
(Pr[R] ·
∑
v∗
(Pr[v∗] · b(v∗, R)))
=
∑
v∗
(Pr[v∗] ·
∑
R
(Pr[R] · b(v∗, R)))
=
∑
v∗
(Pr[v∗] · pv∗,R) = E[pv∗,R] = E[pi({v∗})]/n
Resulting in
EPT = E[ω(MR)] +m · E[pR]
= E[ω(MR)] +
m
n
· E[pi({v∗})]
This completes the proof.
Lemma 4 shows that if we randomly sample a node from
V∗ and calculate its expected prevention p, then on aver-
age we have p = n
m
(EPT − E[ω(MR)]). This implies that
n
m
(EPT−E[ω(MR)]) ≤ OPTL, since OPTL is the maximum
expected prevention of any size-k node set.
Recall that the expected runtime complexity of Algorithm
1 is O(θ · EPT ). Now, suppose we are able to identify a
parameter t such that t = Ω( n
m
(EPT − E[ω(MR)])) and
t ≤ OPTL. Then, by setting θ = λ/t, we can guarantee
that Algorithm 1 is correct, since θ ≥ λ/OPTL, and has an
expected runtime complexity of
O(θ · EPT ) = O
(λ
t
· EPT
)
= O
(
λ · EPT
n
m
(EPT − E[ω(MR)])
)
(6)
Furthermore, we can define a ratio γ ∈ (0, 1) which cap-
tures the relationship between E[ω(MR)] and EPT by writ-
ing E[ω(MR)] = γEPT . Then we can rewrite Equation 6
as
O
(m
n
( 1
1− γ
)
λ
)
= O((k + l)(m+ n)(1/(1− γ)) logn/2)
(7)
Note that γ is an instance-based parameter not present
in the work of Tang et al, but arises from the MCIC model.
See Section 5 for a detailed discussion of γ.
Computing t. Ideally, we seek a t that increases mono-
tonically with k to mimic the behaviour of OPTL. Suppose
we take k samples ei = (vi, wi) with replacement over a
uniform distribution on the edges in G, and use the vi’s to
form a node set S∗. Let KPT be the mean of the expected
prevention of S∗ over the randomness in S∗ and the preven-
tion process. Due to the submodularity of the prevention
function, it can be verified that KPT increases with k and
n
m
(
EPT − E[ω(MR)]
)
≤ KPT ≤ OPTL (8)
Additionally,
Lemma 5. Let R be a random RRC set and ωpi(R) be the
subwidth of R. Define
κ(R) = 1−
(
1− ωpi(R)
m
)k
(9)
Then, KPT = n · E[κ(R)], where the expectation is taken
over the random choices of R.
Lemma 5 shows we can estimate KPT by first computing
n · κ(R) on a set of random RRC sets and taking the aver-
age of the resulting measurements. However, as dictated by
Chernoff bounds, if we want to obtain an estimate of KPT
with δ ∈ (0, 1) relative error with at least 1 − n−l prob-
ability then the number of samples required is Ω(ln logn ·
δ−2/KPT ). That is, the number of measurements required
to estimate KPT depends on KPT itself. This issue is also
encountered in [24] and we are able to resolve it by mimick-
ing their adaptive sampling approach, which dynamically
adjusts the number of measurements based on the observed
values of κ(R), under the MCIC model.
Algorithm 3 KptEstimation(G,k,AC)
1: for i = 1 to log2 n− 1 do
2: Let ci = (6l logn+ 6 log(log2 n)) · 2i
3: Let sum = 0
4: for j = 1 to ci do
5: Generate a random RRC set R
6: κ(R) = 1− (1− ωpi(R)
m
)k
7: sum = sum+ κ(R)
8: if sum/ci > 1/2
i then
9: return KPT ∗ = n · sum/(2 · ci)
10: return KPT ∗ = 1
Estimating KPT. Algorithm 3 presents the sampling ap-
proach for estimatingKPT . The high level idea is as follows.
Since KPT is an unknown quantity, we begin with the as-
sumption that it takes on the value n/2. Then, we compute
an estimate for the expected value of κ(R) based on a rela-
tively few number of samples. Chernoff bounds allow us to
determine if the computed value of KPT = n·κ(R) is a good
estimator and, if so, the algorithm terminates. However, if
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the estimate is much smaller than n/2 we apply the stan-
dard doubling approach and generate an increased number
of samples to determine if KPT takes on a value close to
half the initial estimate. The algorithm continues comput-
ing estimates for KPT , based on an increasing number of
samples, and comparing to values that halve in size until the
error bounds dictated by Chernoff bounds indicate we have
reached a suitably precise estimation of KPT .
More specifically, in each iteration (Lines 2-7), the goal of
Algorithm 3 is to compute the average value of κ(R) over
ci randomly generated RRC sets from G. As described in
Lemma’s 6 and 7 below, the ci are chosen carefully such
that if the average computed for κ(R) over the ci samples is
greater than 2−i then we can conclude that we have a good
estimate for KPT with high probability. More precisely,
that the expected value of κ(R) is at least half of the average
computed. Conversely, if the average computed is too small
then Chernoff bounds imply that we have a bad estimate for
KPT and the algorithm proceeds to the next iteration.
In the case that the true value of KPT is very small, the
algorithm will terminate in the log2 n-th iteration and return
KPT ∗ = 1, which equals the smallest possible KPT (since
each node in the seed set can always save itself assuming
INFC ≥ k). As we will show in the next section, KPT ∗ ∈
[KPT/4, OPTL] holds with a high probability. Thus, setting
θ = λ/KPT ∗ ensures Algorithm 1 is correct and achieves
the expected runtime complexity in Equation 7.
Performance Bounds. Proving the correctness and demon-
strating bounds on the runtime for Algorithm 3 requires a
careful analysis of the algorithm’s behaviour. As shown be-
low, we make use of two lemmas to prove that the algo-
rithm’s estimate of KPT ∗ is close to KPT .
Let K be the distribution of κ(R) over random RRC sets
in G with domain [0, 1]. Let µ = KPT/n, and si be the
sum of ci i.i.d. samples from K, where ci is defined as ci =
(6l logn+ 6 log(log2 n)) · 2i. Chernoff bounds give
Lemma 6. If µ ≤ 2−j, then for any i ∈ [1, j − 1],
Pr
[
si
ci
>
1
2i
]
<
1
nl · log2 n
(10)
By Lemma 6, if KPT ≤ 2−j , then Algorithm 3 is very
unlikely to terminate in any of the first j − 1 iterations.
This prevents the algorithm from outputting a KPT ∗ too
much larger than KPT .
Lemma 7. If µ ≥ 2−j, then for any i ≥ j + 1,
Pr
[
si
ci
>
1
2i
]
> 1−
( 1
nl · log2 n
)2i−j−1
(11)
By Lemma 7, if KPT ≤ 2−j and Algorithm 3 enters iter-
ation i > j + 1, then it will terminate in the i-th iteration
with high probability. This ensures that the algorithm does
not output a KPT ∗ that is too much smaller than KPT .
Based on Lemmas 6 and 7, we prove the following theorem
for the correctness and expected runtime of Algorithm 3.
Theorem 2. When n ≥ 2 and l ≥ 1/2, Algorithm 3 re-
turns KPT ∗ ∈ [KPT/4, OPTL] with at least 1 − n−l prob-
ability, and runs in O(l(m + n)(1/(1 − γ)) logn) expected
time. Furthermore, E[ 1
KPT∗ ] <
12
KPT
.
4.3 Improved Parameter Estimation
This section presents a heuristic for improving the prac-
tical performance of RPS, without affecting its asymptotic
guarantees, by improving the estimated lower bound onOPTL.
Algorithm 4 RefineKPT(G,k,AC , KPT ∗, ′)
1: Let λ′ = (2 + ′)ln logn · (′)−2.
2: Let θ′ = λ′/KPT ∗.
3: Generate θ′ random RRC sets; put them into a set R′.
4: Initialize a node set S′k = ∅.
5: for i = 1 to k do
6: Identify node vi that covers the most RRC sets inR′.
7: Add vi to S
′
k.
8: Remove from R′ all RRC sets that are covered by vi.
9: Let f be the fraction of the original θ′ RRC sets that
are covered by S′k.
10: Let KPT ′ = f · n/(1 + ′)
11: return KPT+ = max{KPT ′,KPT ∗}
The KPT ∗ output by Algorithm 3 largely determines the
efficiency of RPS. If KPT ∗ is close to OPTL, then θ =
λ/KPT ∗ is small and Algorithm 1 only needs to generate a
relatively small number of RRC sets. However, if KPT ∗ 
OPTL then the efficiency of Algorithm 1 degrades rapidly
and, in turn, so does the overall performance of RPS.
To remedy this issue, we add an intermediate step before
Algorithm 1 to refine KPT ∗ into a potentially tighter lower-
bound of OPTL. The intuition behind this heuristic is to
generate a reduced number θ′ of random RRC sets, placing
them into a set R′, and then apply the greedy approach (for
the maximum coverage problem) on R′ to obtain a good es-
timator for the maximum expected prevention in R′. Thus,
we can use the estimation as a good lower-bound for OPTL.
Algorithm 4 shows the pseudo-code of the intermediate
step. It first generates θ′ random RRC sets and invokes
the greedy approach for the maximum coverage problem
on R′ to obtain a size-k node set S′k. Algorithm 4 com-
putes the fraction f of RRC sets that are covered by S′k
so that, by Corollary 1, f · n is an unbiased estimation of
E[pi(S′k)]. We set θ′ based on the KPT ∗ output by Algo-
rithm 3 to a reasonably large number to ensure that f · n <
(1 + ′) · E[pi(S′k)] occurs with at least 1 − n−l probability.
Based on this, Algorithm 4 computes KPT ′ = f ·n/(1 + ′)
scaling f · n down by a factor of 1 + ′ to ensure that
KPT ′ ≤ E[pi(S′k)] ≤ OPTL. The final output of Algorithm
4 is KPT+ = max{KPT ′,KPT ∗}. Below we give a lemma
that shows the theoretical guarantees of Algorithm 4.
Lemma 8. Given that E[ 1
KPT∗ ] <
12
KPT
, Algorithm 4 runs
in O(l(m+n)(1/(1−γ)) logn/(′)2) expected time. In addi-
tion, it returns KPT+ ∈ [KPT ∗, OPTL] with at least 1−n−l
probability, if KPT ∗ ∈ [KPT/4, OPTL].
Summary of steps. In summary, we integrate Algorithm
4 into RPS and obtain an improved solution (referred to
as RPS+) as follows. Given G, k, AC , , and l, we first
invoke Algorithm 3 to derive KPT ∗. After that, we feed
G, k, AC , KPT ∗, and a parameter ∗ (as defined in [24])
to Algorithm 4, and obtain KPT+ in return. Then, we
compute θ = λ/KPT+, where λ is as defined in Equation
4. Finally, we run Algorithm 1 with G, k, AC , and θ as the
input and get the output S∗k as the final result of prevention
maximization.
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By Theorems 1 and 2, Equation 7, and the union bound,
RPS runs in O((k+ l)(m+n)(1/(1− γ)) logn/2) expected
time and it can be verified that when ′ ≥ /√k, RPS+
has the same time complexity as RPS. Furthermore, RPS+
returns a (1 − 1/e − )-approximate solution with at least
1 − 3n−l probability and the success probability can be in-
creased to 1−n−l by scaling l up by a factor of 1+log 3/ logn.
5. LOWER BOUNDS
Comparison with Greedy. As mentioned previously, Greedy
runs inO(kmnr) time, where r is the number of Monte Carlo
samples used to estimate the expected prevention of each
node set. Budak et al. do not provide a formal result on
how r should be set to achieve a (1−1/e−)-approximation
ratio in the MCIC model; instead, they only point out that
when each estimation of expected prevention has  related
error, Greedy returns a (1 − 1/e − )-approximate solution
for a certain ′ [4]. In the following lemma, we present a
more detailed characterization of the relationship between r
and Greedy ’s approximation ratio in the MCIC model:
Lemma 9. Greedy returns a (1 − 1/e − )-approximate
solution with at least 1− n−l probability, if
r ≥ (8k2 + 2k) · n · (l + 1) logn+ log k
2 ·OPTL (12)
Assume that we know OPTL in advance and set r to the
smallest value satisfying the above inequality, in Greedy ’s
favour. In that case, the time complexity of Greedy is
O(k3lmn2−2 logn/OPTL). Furthermore, we have the fol-
lowing upper bound on the value of γ:
Claim 1. γ ≤ n
n+1
Claim 1 shows that the expected runtime for RPS is at
most O((k + l)mn−2 logn). As a consequence, given that
OPTL ≤ n, the expected runtime of Greedy is always more
than the expected runtime of RPS. In practice, we observe
that for typical social networks OPTL  n and 11−γ  n+1
resulting in superior scalability of RPS compared to Greedy.
Table 3 confirms that 1
1−γ  n+ 1 on our small datasets.
A Lower Bound for EIL. In the theorem below, we pro-
vide a lower bound on the time it takes for any algorithm to
compute a β-approximation for the EIL problem given uni-
form node sampling and an adjacency list representation.
Thus, we rule out the possibility of a sublinear time algo-
rithm for the EIL problem for an arbitrary β.
Theorem 3. Let 0 <  < 1
10e
, β ≤ 1 be given. Any ran-
domized algorithm for EIL that returns a set of seed nodes
with approximation ratio β, with probability at least 1− 1
e
−,
must have a runtime of at least β(m+n)
24min{k,1/β} .
The proof of Theorem 3 uses Yao’s Minmax Lemma for
the performance of Las Vegas (LV) randomized algorithms
on a family of inputs [26]. Precisely, the lemma states that
the least expected cost of deterministic LV algorithms on
a distribution over a family of inputs is a lower bound on
the expected cost of the optimal randomized LV algorithm
over that family of inputs. We build such an input family
of lower bound graphs via the use of a novel gadget.
6. EXPERIMENTS
In this section, we present our experimental results. All
of our algorithms are implemented in C++ (available at
https://github.com/stamps) and tested on a machine with
dual 6 core 2.10GHz Intel Xeon CPUs, 128GB RAM and
running Ubuntu 14.04.2.
Datasets. The network statistics for all of the datasets
we consider are shown in Table 2. We obtained the datasets
from Laboratory of Web Algorithmics.2 We divide the
2http://law.di.unimi.it/datasets.php
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Name |V | |E| Average degree
nethept 15,229 62,752 4.1
word assoc 10,617 72,172 6.8
dblp-2010 326,186 1,615,400 6.1
cnr-2000 325,557 3,216,152 9.9
ljournal-2008 5,363,260 79,023,142 28.5
Table 2: Dataset Statistics
datasets by horizontal lines according to their size, small
(S), medium (M), and large (L).
Propagation Model. We consider the MCIC model
(see Section 2.1) of Budak et al. We set the propagation
probability of each edge e as follows: we first identify the
node v that e points to, and then set p(e) = 1/i, where i
denotes the in-degree of v. This setting of p(e) is widely
adopted in prior work [6, 5, 13, 25].
Parameters. Unless otherwise specified, we set  = 0.1
and k = 10 in our experiments. We set l in a way that
ensures a success probability of 1− 1/n. For Greedy, we set
the number of Monte Carlo steps to r = 10000, following the
standard practice in the literature. Note that this choice of r
is to the advantage of Greedy because the value of r required
to achieve the same theoretical guarantees as RPS in our
experiments is always much larger than 10000. In each of
our experiments, we repeat each run three times and report
the average result.
We are interested in simulating the misinformation pre-
vention process when the bad campaign C has a sizable influ-
ence on the network to best demonstrate how the techniques
could be used in real world settings. That is, we believe the
scenario in which we are attempting to prevent the spread
of misinformation when the bad campaign has the ability
to influence a large fraction of the network to be more rel-
evant than when only a very small number of users would
adopt the bad campaign. Towards this end, we first com-
pute the top-k influential vertices for each network and then
randomly select the seed set AC from the top-1 and top-5
vertices for each experiment. This process ensures the mis-
information has a large potential influence in the network.
The measures of effectiveness in our experiments are the
algorithm efficiency measured in runtime and the algorithm
accuracy measured in percentage of nodes saved. Our goal is
to demonstrate the superior runtime of RPS as the accuracy
has been covered extensively in [4].
Running-time Results. First, we plot the runtimes of
Greedy and RPS for a single seed in Figure 3 and observe
that RPS provides a significant improvement of several or-
ders of magnitude over Greedy. Note, we only compare RPS
to Greedy on the smallest networks due to the substantial
runtime required for Greedy. Furthermore, for similar scal-
ing issues of Greedy, we restrict our comparison to k = 1.
However, since both approaches scale linearly with k we can
conclude that RPS offers a tremendous runtime improve-
ment over the approach of [4].
Next, we show the total runtimes (Figures 5, 9), computa-
tion breakdowns (Figures 4, 7, 10), and prevention (Figures
8, 11) for each dataset. We observe that the vast majority
of the computation time is spent on generating the RRC
sets for R. Furthermore, we see that, consistent with the
results reported in [4], RPS quickly approaches a maximal
word assoc nethept
k top1 top5 top1 top5
1 23.4471 25.9804 48.3194 48.619
10 24.8521 26.6518 60.5 43.1875
20 24.7509 25.2607 57.0111 61.4167
max 10,618 10,618 15,230 15,230
Table 3: 1
1−γ values for small datasets.
expected prevention value as k increases across all datasets.
We now compare the runtime trends of our results for the
EIL problem to those of [24] for the IM problem. Tang et al.
report that, when k increases, the runtime of their approach
(TIM ) tends to decrease before eventually increasing. They
explain this by considering the breakdown of the computa-
tion times required by each algorithm in TIM. They observe
that the computation time is mainly incurred by their analog
to Algorithm 1 (the node selection phase) which is primarily
determined by the number θ of RR sets that need to be gen-
erated. They have θ = λ/KPT+, where λ is analogous to
ours, and KPT+ is a lower-bound on the optimal influence
of a size-k node set. In both the IC and MCIC models, the
analogs of λ and KPT+ increase with k, and it happens that
for the IM problem, Tang et al. observe that the increase of
KPT+ is more pronounced than that of λ for smaller values
of k, which leads to the decrease in TIM s runtime.
On the contrary, for the EIL problem, the increase of
KPT+ does not dominate to a point that the runtime of
RPS decreases as k increases. Instead, we see a linear in-
crease in runtime as k increases for all the networks consid-
ered (Figures 5, 9). To explain, consider how KPT+ grows
in each setting. In the MCIC model we see that KPT+
rapidly approaches its maximal value which corresponds to
the growth of KPT+ plateauing much sooner. In contrast,
in the IC model, the analogous KPT+ value continues to
grow at a significant rate for a wider range of k values since
the ceiling for the maximal influence is not tied to a second
campaign, as it is in the MCIC model. As such, the influ-
ence estimates do not level off as quickly. This translates to
the growth of KPT+ outpacing the growth of λ.
Memory Consumption. Our final set of experiments
monitors the memory consumption required to store the
RRC set structure R. We observe that the size of R for the
EIL problem is larger than that required by the IM prob-
lem. In the “hypergraph” nomenclature due to Borgs et al.
R is viewed as a hypergraph with each RRC set in R corre-
sponding to a hyperedge. We observe that the hyperedges
generated for the IM problem are non-empty in every iter-
ation of the algorithm. Additionally, each hyperedge has
relatively small size. The result is that the hypergraph gen-
erated for the IM problem is very dense, but each hyperedge
is relatively “light” (i.e. it contains few nodes).
In contrast, in each iteration of RPS we have a substantial
probability to produce an empty RRC set, since we require
that a randomly selected node is in the randomized BFS tree
resulting from the influence propagation process initialized
at AC . Even though our seed sets for campaign C are chosen
at random from the top-k sets, and thus are highly influential
(resulting in a large randomized BFS tree), the probability
of overlap with a randomly selected node is still small due
to the vast size of the networks considered. These empty
RRC sets are necessary for the computation of the expected
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Figure 3: Runtimes comparison between RPS and Greedy for wordassociation-2011 (left) and nethept (right) datasets.
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Figure 4: Breakdown of computation time (s) for small datasets. Blue stack corresponds to Algorithm 1, red to Algorithm 4, and green
(which is almost invisible) to Algorithm 3. Listed left to right: word assoc top1, word assoc top5, nethept top1, nethept top5.
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Figure 5: Runtimes (s) for small datasets. word assoc on the
left and nethept on the right with blue for top1 and red for top5.
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Figure 6: Runtimes (s) for ljournal-2008. Left is top1 and right
is top5.
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Figure 7: Breakdown of computation time (s) for ljournal-2008.
Blue stack corresponds to Algorithm 1, red to Algorithm 4, and
green to Algorithm 3. Left is top1 and right is top5.
prevention to be accurate, but results in a hypergraph that
differs significantly from that of the IM problem.
In particular, since the generateRRC algorithm is a de-
terministic BFS (with specialized stopping conditions to ac-
count for cutoff nodes) it reaches a much larger fraction of
the network. Therefore, while there are far fewer non-empty
hyperedges generated, they are much large in size: often on
the order of half the network. Thus, the resulting hyper-
graph is sparse, but contains very “heavy” edges.
These two opposing metrics, a dense hypergraph with
“light” hyperedges versus a sparse hypergraph with “heavy”
hyperedges, result in the latter requiring more memory to
store. Memory consumption statistics are shown in Fig. 12.
Despite a larger memory requirement compared to the single
campaign setting we show that our approach has the ability
to scale far beyond what was achieved by Budak et al. and
provides orders of magnitude improvement for the runtime.
7. RELATED WORK
There exists a large body of work on the Influence Maxi-
mization problem first proposed by Kempe et al. [15]. The
primary focus of the research community has been related
to improving the practical efficiency of the Greedy approach.
These works fall into two categories: heuristics that trade
efficiency for approximation guarantees [13, 25] and practi-
cal optimizations that speed up Greedy while retaining the
approximation guarantees [16, 6, 9]. Leskovec et al. [16]
present algorithmic optimizations to Greedy that reduces
the runtime up to 700-fold by avoiding the evaluation of the
expected influence for many node sets, while [6, 9] provide
further refinements to the approach of [16]. Despite these
advancements, the ability of Greedy to scale to web-scale
networks remained unfeasible.
The breakthrough work of Borgs’ et al. [3] brought the
first asymptotic runtime improvements while maintaining
the (1−1/e−)-approximation guarantees with their reverse
influence sampling technique. Furthermore, they prove their
approach is near-optimal under the IC model. Tang et al.
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Figure 8: Expected prevention (%) for small datasets. Blue plot corresponds to KPT+ and red plot to RPS. Listed left to right:
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1 2 5 10 20 30 40
0
1,000
2,000
k
1 2 5 10 20 30 40
0
1,000
2,000
k
1 2 5 10 20 30 40
0
500
1,000
1,500
k
1 2 5 10 20 30 40
0
1,000
2,000
k
Figure 10: Breakdown of computation time (s) for medium datasets. Blue stack corresponds to Algorithm 1, red to Algorithm 4, and
green to Algorithm 3. Listed left to right: dblp top1, dblp top5, cnr top1, cnr top5.
0 20 40
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
k
0 20 40
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
k
0 20 40
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
k
0 20 40
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
k
0 5 10
0
0.5
1
k
0 5 10
0
0.5
1
k
Figure 11: Expected prevention (%) for medium & large datasets. Blue plot corresponds to KPT+ and red plot to RPS. Listed left
to right: dblp top1, dblp top5, cnr top1, cnr top5, ljournal-2008 top1, ljournal-2008 top5.
0 20 40
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
k
0 20 40
0.2
0.4
0.6
k
0 20 40
0
5
10
15
20
k
0 20 40
5
10
15
k
0 5 10
50
100
150
k
Figure 12: Memory consumption (Gb) for all datasets. Blue corresponds to top1 and red to top5. Listed left to right: word assoc,
nethept, cnr, dblp & ljournal-2008.
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[24] presented practical and theoretical improvements to the
approach of Borgs’ et al. that lead to the elimination of a
large hidden constant in the runtime and novel heuristics
that result in up to 100-fold improvements to the runtime
of their TIM approach.
Related to the ongoing work in identifying influential users
in a network, there has been a significant amount of work
on incorporating the spread of competing campaigns [2, 18,
22, 12] and the spread of misinformation and rumours [4, 7,
20, 17] by augmenting or extending the IC model. The work
most related to ours is [18] where they extend the reverse
influence sampling technique of [3] to competing campaigns
(such as two competing products). However, their work dif-
fers from ours in three important ways: first, they use the
COIC model of [4] (as opposed to the MCIC model) where
the edge probabilities are campaign oblivious. That is, no
matter which information reaches a node, it is propagated
with a single fixed probability for both campaigns. Budak
et al. note that this alternative model does not capture the
notion of misinformation as well as the MCIC model, but
instead that it is better suited for the spread of multiple com-
peting campaigns. More importantly, the COIC model does
not require the concept of blocking defined in this paper.
Since all probabilities are the same, shortest paths suffice
for determining which campaign a node adopts. Therefore
the work of [18] does not require the new definitions we in-
troduce to close the shortest paths gap in the analysis of
[4] for the MCIC model. Secondly, since they operate in
the COIC model, they are studying a fundamentally differ-
ent problem. They are studying the influence maximization
problem between competing products and not misinforma-
tion prevention. Finally, the scalability of their approach is
orders of magnitude less than ours as their largest experi-
ments are on a network with only 500,000 edges.
8. CONCLUSION
In this work we presented RPS, a novel and scalable ap-
proach to the EIL problem. We present proofs of correct-
ness and a detailed running-time analysis of our approach.
Furthermore, we experimentally verify the performance of
our algorithm on a collection of large social networks and
observe a significant improvement over the state-of-the-art
Greedy approach. Finally, we provide additional theoret-
ical results in the form of two lower bounds: one on the
running-time requirement for any approach to solve the EIL
problem and another of the number of Monte Carlo simu-
lations required by Greedy to return a correct solution with
high probability. We follow up the second lower bound re-
sult by showing that it implies that the expected runtime of
RPS is always less than the expected runtime of Greedy.
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